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amusement tax on its football games and held the case to be within
the letter of the act. Allen v. Regents of the University of Georgia,
304 U. S. 439 (1938).
Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has
been interpreted to the effect that an aggrieved party can sup-
press illegally seized evidence not only in advance of trial but also
in advance of indictment. This liberal construction is rational-
ized by recognizing the harm wrought by a wrongful indictment,
even if it does not result in a conviction. In Re Fried, 161 F. 2d 453(2d Cir. 1947). Another theory allows suppression in advance of
indictment because the court may reach forward to control the
presentation of evidence that may come before it. Foley v. United
States, 64 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933).
Although Rule 41 (e) would seem to be the best method avail-
able, this rule does not purport or otherwise appear to be an ex-
clusive remedy; for the doctrine rests on and is inseparably tied
up with the property right of the person from whom the article is
taken. Foley v. United States, supra.
It would seem to follow that the present case "falls within the
letter and spirit of Rule 25 (d)", and substitution should be al-
lowed as a matter of course. The attitude of the court seems to
evince a tacit desire to delimit and narrowly confine the sup-
pression and return of illegally seized property to the exact
remedy afforded by Rule 41 (e) of The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. If this be the unarticulated ground for the court's
dismissal, it is deplorable that a defendant should be deprived
of his substantive rights by a mis-application of procedure.
Howard L. Meyer, II
LABOR LAW -RETAIL STORE OWNER MAY DENY
UNION OPPORTUNITY TO REPLY TO
PRE-ELECTION SPEECH
Employer, variety store, addressed its employees on company
time and on company property, exhorting them to vote against
the union in the coming election. Requests by the union for an
opportunity to address the employees under similar circumstances
were refused. The N. L. R. B. found that the employer's refusal
constituted discriminatory application of its no-solicitation rule.
In a proceeding on petition for enforcement of a cease and desist
order, Held (2-1): Employer is not required to provide equal op-
portunity to union representatives to speak to employees on the
premises and during working hours. N. L. R. B. v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 214 F. 2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954).
RECENT DECISIONS
The courts have held that the N. L. R. B. can require an em-
ployer to allow union solicitation on working premises- during
non-working hours even where there is no showing that solicita-
tion elsewhere would be ineffective. Republic Aviation Corp. v.
N. L. R. B., 324 U. S. 793 (1945). An exception has been made to
this general rule in allowing retail department stores, the privilege
of prohibiting all solicitation within the selling areas of the store
during working and non-working hours, N. L. R. B. v. May Dept.
Stores Co., 154 F. 2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946).
Before 1947, the N. L. R. B. and the courts were reluctant to
allow the employer any opportunity to make anti-union speeches
to his employees on the ground that any employer opinion un-
favorable to unionization was coercive because of the employers,'
control over employees. N. L. R. B. v. Federbush. Co., Inc., 121
F. 2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941). It was later recognized in a dictum that
an employer might have the right to make such speeches on
company time and property if similar opportunity were given to
the union. N. L. R. B. v. Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 163 F. 2d 373, 376
(2d Cir. 1947). Because the actual holding of the Clark Bros.
case, that an employer's anti-union speech to his employees dur-
ing working hours and on company time was an unfair labor prac-
tice, was deemed too restrictive of employer free speech, the "em-
ployer free speech amendment" was included in the Taft-Hartley
Act, 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (c) (Supp. 1952). This
amendment provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis-
semination thereof . . . shall not constitute . . . an unfair
labor practice under any provisions of this Act, if such expres-
sion contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
The employer free speech amendment was qualified by a deci-
sion that if an employer retail department store chose to close
its selling areas to union solicitation, then it must abstain from
campaigning against the union on the same premises to which
the union was denied access. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. N. L. R. B.,
197 F. 2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952). The decision in Bonwit Teller was
modified by an N. L. R. B. declaration that in the absence of a
broad no-solicitation rule (i. e., one which prohibits union solicita-
tion during non-working as well as working hours), an employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes' a pre-elec-
tion speech to his employees on company time and premises and
denies the union's request for an opportunity to reply. See Liv-
ingston Shirt Corp., 107 N. L. R. B. 109 (1953). According to this
dictum, the broad no-solicitation rule in the instant case would
preclude the employer from making any anti-union speeches on
company time and property because this would be a discrimina-
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tory application of the no-solicitation rule. The majority in the
present case applies the holding of the Livingston Shirt case (that
a no-solicitation rule applying only to working hours leaves the
employer's right to speak unqualified), inasmuch as the union
organizer asked only for an opportunity to speak on working
time, and did not ask for an opportunity to speak on non-working
time.
The dissenting opinion, in accord with the decision of the Board,
declared that there was no issue of employer free speech involved.
It maintained, rather, that section 8(a) (1), forbidding as unfair
labor practices employer interference with employees' exercise of
their rights to self-organization, was involved.
By expanding the holding of the Livingston Shirt Corp. case
and failing to follow the dictum of that case the court has given
the employer great leeway under section 8(c). But the court has
at most overruled previous restrictive interpretations of the em-
ployer free speech amendment. This would seem to carry out
the intention of the legislature in passing the amendment.
Dawn Girard
PERSONAL PROPERTY -JOINT TENANCY
IN SAFE DEPOSIT BOX
Decedent and his niece executed an agreement making the niece
joint owner of the contents of a safe deposit box with right of ac-
cess to it. Both acknowledged receipt of keys from the bank, but
decedent retained possession of both. Held (4-3): No valid inter
vivos gift of the contents was made since decedent did not suffi-
ciently divest himself of dominion over the property. Chadrow
v. Kellnian, - Pa. -, 106 A. 2d 594 (1954).
The mere deposit of an article in a jointly leased or used safe-
deposit box of itself results in no change of title. Bauernschmidt
v. Bauernschmidt, 97 INd. 35, 54 A. 637 (1903); Mercantile Safe
Deposit Co. v. Huntington, 89 Hun 465, "35 N. Y. Supp. 390 (Sup.
Ct. 1895) ; In re Brown, 86 Misc. 187, 149 N. Y. Supp. 138 (Surr.
Ct. 1914), aff'd 167 App. Div. 912, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1106 (1915),
217 N. Y. 621, 111 N. E. 1085 (1916). Even when the language of
the lease is in terms of joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
unless the lease clearly refers to the contents, it is generally con-
strued as giving no further right than the use of the box. Wohle-
ber's Estate, 320 Pa. 83, 181 A. 479 (1935) ; Richards v. Richards,
141 N. J. Eq. 579, 58 A. 2d 544 (1948); In re Dean's Estate, 68
Cal. 2d 86, 155 P. 2d 901 (1945). Thus, a contract with a bank
signed by a husband and his wife stating that they were joint
258
